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A B S T R A C T
This study describes the results of a dynamic quantitative microbial risk assessment (QMRA) for norovirus (NoV)
that was used to evaluate the relative significance of foodborne, person-to-person, and person-to-sewage-to-
person transmission pathways. This last pathway was incorporated into simulated potable reuse systems to
evaluate the adequacy of typical treatment trains, operational conditions, and regulatory frameworks. The re-
sults confirm that secondary and foodborne transmission dominate the overall risk calculation and that wa-
terborne NoV likely contributes no appreciable public health risk, at least in the scenarios modeled in this study.
De facto reuse with an environmental buffer storage time of at least 30 days was comparable or even superior to
direct potable reuse (DPR) when compound failures during advanced treatment were considered in the model.
Except during these low-probability failure events, DPR generally remained below the 10−4 annual risk
benchmark for drinking water. Based on system feedback and the time-dependent pathogen load to the com-
munity's raw sewage, this model estimated median raw wastewater NoV concentrations of 107–108 genome
copies per liter (gc/L), which is consistent with high-end estimates in recent literature.
1. Introduction
Quantitative microbial risk assessments (QMRAs) for waterborne
pathogens generally involve static models in which the probability of
infection is calculated as a single exposure event with minimal (if any)
time dependence or system feedback. This results in a disconnect be-
tween the number of shedding individuals at any given time, the pa-
thogen load to the environment and the water/wastewater treatment
infrastructure, and the implications for public health risk. This dis-
connect also makes it particularly difficult to fully characterize risks
associated with highly contagious pathogens, such as norovirus (NoV),
which often involve numerous ‘secondary’ infections (Zelner et al.,
2010). Ultimately, static QMRAs may underestimate the true risk of
waterborne disease within a community by not capturing the effects of
secondary transmission. Conversely, static QMRAs can also over-
estimate the risk of waterborne disease by not accounting for its sig-
nificance relative to other exposure pathways or its time dependence.
Specifically, an individual exposed to a waterborne pathogen may be-
come infected and diseased but may then enter a protected or immune
state. The risk of developing a new infection during this
epidemiological progression is diminished or negligible
(Eisenberg et al., 2004).
In 1996, the International Life Sciences Institute (ILSI) collaborated
with the United States (U.S.) Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to
develop a revised QMRA framework, specifically emphasizing the im-
portance of secondary transmission and immunity in accurately char-
acterizing certain pathogen risks (ILSI, 1996). Soon thereafter,
Eisenberg et al. (1996) described the first dynamic model for water-
borne disease and then expanded the model to account for the unique
properties of target pathogens, including asymptomatic vs. sympto-
matic infection ratios; the duration of incubation, infection, and im-
munity; and shedding rate (Eisenberg et al., 2002, 2004). Fig. 1 illus-
trates these key properties and the principal epidemiological states,
namely susceptible (S), exposed (E), carrier state 1 (C1), diseased (D),
carrier state 2 (C2), and post-infection (P). There are now dynamic
models that describe risk associated with recreational activities
(Eisenberg et al., 1996), biosolids-amended soils (Eisenberg et al.,
2004), the Milwaukee cryptosporidiosis outbreak (Eisenberg et al.,
1998; Brookhart et al., 2002; Eisenberg et al., 2005), and the effects of
post-infection immunity to NoV (Simmons et al., 2013). Although
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Soller and Eisenberg (2008) confirmed that these dynamic models are
warranted in high risk scenarios (i.e., >1 in 1,000), they also noted the
difficulty in accurately defining some disease transmission parameters,
thereby highlighting the potential suitability and preference for static
models in some cases. Many static models can simultaneously address
risks from a wide range of pathogens (Soller et al., 2017;
Amoueyan et al., 2019), but this may be overly complex in dynamic
models because of the varying epidemiology among bacterial, viral, and
protozoan pathogens.
As noted earlier, NoV is a potential high risk pathogen warranting
consideration for dynamic risk modeling. NoV is the most common
cause of acute gastroenteritis in the U.S., with more than 20 million
cases annually (Scallan et al., 2011; Hall et al., 2013). NoV is often
transmitted through contaminated food, such as leafy green vegetables
and fruit, with foodborne exposure accounting for more than 25% of all
NoV-associated infections (Scallan et al., 2011) and up to 50% of all
foodborne outbreaks in the U.S. (CDC, 2009, 2010, 2011). NoV has also
been implicated in several outbreaks linked to contaminated wells or
recreational water (Anderson et al., 2003; Parshionikar et al., 2003),
and NoV has recently emerged as an important target pathogen for
potable reuse.
Several studies have presented QMRAs for a wide variety of wa-
terborne pathogens relevant to indirect potable reuse (IPR) and direct
potable reuse (DPR) (Olivieri et al., 1999; Amoueyan et al., 2017, 2019;
Chaudhry et al., 2017; Lim et al., 2017; Pecson et al., 2017; Soller et al.,
2017), but recent studies have specifically implicated NoV as a poten-
tial driver of risk (Soller et al., 2017, 2018a,b). These existing models
are based on static frameworks that do not account for the impacts of
alternative exposure routes (e.g., consumption of contaminated food),
secondary transmission, or the duration of post-infection immunity.
Therefore, further study is needed to better characterize the relative
risk of waterborne exposure to NoV in comparison with other exposure
pathways (e.g., person-to-person or foodborne).
The objective of this study was to develop a dynamic QMRA to
evaluate the risk of acquiring NoV-associated gastroenteritis in potable
reuse systems, including the historically common practice of de facto
reuse and also with DPR employing reverse osmosis or an ozone-based
alternative treatment train. The resulting model incorporated treatment
train reliability (i.e., nominal operating conditions vs. failure modes)
and also a comparison of observed log removal values (LRVs) versus
regulatory credits for advanced treatment processes. The dynamic
nature of the model included the aforementioned epidemiological states
and associated durations and allowed for system feedback. Specifically,
the time-variant prevalence of infection/disease directly affected the
pathogen load to the community's raw sewage. Primary exposure to
NoV in drinking water was supplemented with secondary exposure to
infected individuals within the community and primary exposure via
contaminated food. Finally, the dynamic model allowed for a direct
comparison with a corresponding static QMRA for NoV in potable reuse
systems (Amoueyan et al., 2019).
2. Methodology
A conceptual comparison of a static QMRA and the current dynamic
QMRA, which focuses on NoV as the primary hazard, is illustrated in
Fig. 2. The dynamic QMRA assumed susceptible individuals could be
Fig. 1. Dynamic disease transmission model with ‘distributed delays’ used to simultaneously evaluate the impacts of primary and secondary transmission. A death
rate was also incorporated into each epidemiological state but is not shown in the figure. The movement of individuals from one epidemiological state to another is
represented with solid lines, and pathogen transmission routes are represented by dashed lines. Parameters/symbols are defined in Table 1.
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exposed to NoV through contaminated drinking water or food (i.e.,
primary transmission) or contact with infected individuals, surfaces, or
fomites (i.e., secondary transmission) (Hall et al., 2012; Simmons et al.,
2013; CDC, 2014). A Monte Carlo simulation platform was used to
capture stochastic variability in certain model parameters (i.e., food-
borne transmission rate constant, treatment process performance and
failures, upstream surface water NoV concentration, duration within an
epidemiological state, shedding rate, feces production rate, and was-
tewater generation rate) and under certain modeling scenarios (i.e., raw
sewage NoV concentration for static modeling). For the dynamic con-
figuration, the model simulated pathogen shedding into the wastewater
to directly couple the prevalence of infection/disease within the com-
munity to drinking water risk. Each of these model components is de-
scribed in greater detail in the following sections.
2.1. Norovirus epidemiology
The major components of NoV transmission and the corresponding
assumptions used in the model are summarized in Fig. 1 and Table 1.
The initial population of the community was set at one million and
varied during the model simulation to account for births (rate con-
stant = 3.4 × 10−5 day−1 or 3.4 births per 100,000) and deaths (rate
constant = 2.3 × 10−5 day−1 or 2.3 deaths per 100,000)
(NCHS, 2018). The birth rate was applied to the total population but
only added individuals to the susceptible state, while the death rate was
applied to all epidemiological states (S, E, C1, D, C2, and P). The initial
latent population was assumed to be 0.056% of the total community
(Scallan et al., 2011). Specifically, Scallan et al. (2011) estimated that
there are∼5.5 million cases of foodborne NoV annually in the U.S. and
that those cases account for ∼26% of all symptomatic NoV infections.
This results in a total of ∼21 million symptomatic infections annually.
Assuming a symptomatic ratio of 69% (Zhang et al., 2011; Teunis et al.,
2015), there may be more than 30 million total NoV infections
(symptomatic+asymptomatic) per year, which results in a total cu-
mulative incidence of 0.103 infections/person-year assuming a total
population of 299 million (Scallan et al., 2011). This annual cumulative
incidence was then divided evenly over the year, which resulted in a
cumulative incidence of 0.00056 infections/person (or 0.056% of the
population) over a typical 2-day latency period (CDC, 2014).
Susceptibility to NoV is dependent upon the presence of histo-blood
group antigens within the human gut, and fucosyltransferase 2 enzyme
(FUT2) is required for secretion of these antigens. In non-secretors,
inactivation of FUT2 prevents individuals from contracting an NoV
infection (Currier et al., 2015; Nordgren et al., 2016). In the current
study, non-secretors were assumed to comprise 20% of the initial po-
pulation and 20% of births occurring during the model simulation
(Currier et al., 2015; Simmons et al., 2013). Although these individuals
were not at risk of developing or transmitting NoV infections, they were
still considered in the overall population-based risk calculation. There
were no further distinctions for sex, age, or immunocompromised in-
dividuals.
For the susceptible fraction of the population, the daily risk from
drinking water (i.e., force of infection, λ1) was calculated using the NoV
concentration in the finished drinking water, an assumed water inges-
tion rate of 2 L/day (USEPA, 2004; WHO, 2008), and a fractional
Poisson dose response model (Eq. (1); Messner et al., 2014).
= × − −P P (1 e )μinf,d
Dose
(1)
where, Pinf,d = daily probability of infection, P = fraction of suscep-
tible subjects = 0.722 for NoV, Dose = number of NoV genome copies
(gc) consumed, and µ = mean aggregate size= 1106 gc for NoV.
The average incubation period for NoV (i.e., duration from exposure
to infection) was assumed to follow a uniform distribution ranging from
12 to 48 h (CDC, 2014), and the duration of disease was assumed to
follow a uniform distribution ranging from 1 to 3 days (Aoki et al.,
2010; CDC, 2014). The infected population was also divided into
Fig. 2. Conceptual comparison of (A) static and (B) dynamic quantitative microbial risk assessment (QMRA) frameworks. The static framework represents the
structure of the norovirus QMRA in Amoueyan et al. (2019), and the dynamic framework represents the structure of the current QMRA. Transmission rate constants
(or forces of infection) are defined as follows: λ1 = primary transmission rate constant for drinking water, λ2 = secondary transmission rate constant, λ3 = primary
transmission rate constant for food. The solid lines represent travel of water through an IPR system, and dashed lines represent travel of water through a DPR system.
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symptomatic (69%) and asymptomatic (31%) infections (Zhang et al.,
2011; Teunis et al., 2015). NoV shedding has been shown to be highly
variable and has not been fully characterized (Atmar et al., 2008;
Sabria et al., 2016) so log10uniform distributions were used in this
study to simulate shedding rate. Symptomatic individuals were as-
sumed to shed 8.2 to 12.2 log10 gc/g feces, and asymptomatic in-
dividuals were assumed to shed 7.5 to 11.7 log10 gc/g feces. These
values represent the estimated steady state and peak shedding rates,
respectively, observed in 11 symptomatic and 5 asymptomatic infected
individuals over a two-week observation period (Atmar et al., 2008).
Studies have shown that shedding can last for 2 to 3 weeks post-in-
fection (Okhuysen et al., 1995; Atmar et al., 2008), and post-sympto-
matic individuals (C2 in Fig. 1) sometimes shed at rates similar to when
they were symptomatic (D in Fig. 1) (Milbrath et al., 2013). Therefore,
the asymptomatic (C1) and post-symptomatic (C2) shedding periods
were assumed to follow a uniform distribution ranging from 2 to 21
days with no change in shedding rate. The model assumed that all C1,
D, and C2 individuals shed pathogens into the raw sewage. The feces
production rate followed a uniform distribution ranging from 200 to
750 grams of feces per person-day (Rao, 2006; Barker et al., 2013), and
wastewater generation rate followed a uniform distribution ranging
from 189 to 265 liters per person-day for the entire community
(USEPA, 2002).
The NoV post-infection period (i.e., duration of immunity) was
originally suggested to be at least 6 months (Johnson et al., 1990), but
Simmons et al. (2013) proposed a longer immunity period, which was
incorporated into the current model as a uniform distribution ranging
from 3.2 to 5.1 years. The acquired immunity that develops post-in-
fection ‘wanes’ during the recovery period, in part due to NoV strain
shift, until the individual returns to the fully susceptible state. To in-
corporate waning immunity, it was assumed that the level of protection
during the immunity period (1/γ) decreased linearly from full
protection to no protection (Eisenberg et al., 2004). Four different
compartments with different levels of immunity were used to simulate
the post-infection state (P1, P2, P3, and P4), with P1 representing full
protection and P4 representing the least protection. Therefore, in-
dividuals in P2, P3, and P4 could theoretically move to the exposed
state (E) through primary or secondary NoV exposure, or ultimately
return to the susceptible state with no protection. Eq. (2) was used to
define the rate constant (or force of infection) for movement from each
P compartment to the exposed state (E) (Soller and Eisenberg, 2008).
=
−
λ
λ (i 1)
n
j
ji (2)
where, λji = force of infection for post-infection state (d−1); j = 1
(water) or 3 (food) for primary transmission or 2 for secondary trans-
mission; i = 1, 2, 3, or 4 (depending on the protected state); and
n = total number of compartments in the protected state = 4.
Secondary NoV transmission has been described as having a second-
order rate constant (or force of infection) ranging from 0.08 to 0.24
secondary infections per shedding individual per day
(Zelner et al. 2010). However, the Zelner et al. (2010) study of
household NoV outbreaks noted that their secondary transmission
model was not generalizable at the community or regional scale. In-
stead, the de facto reuse scenario in the current model (described later)
was calibrated to match the aforementioned cumulative incidence of
0.103 infections/person-year (Scallan et al., 2011). The product of the
calibrated parameter and the prevalence of shedding resulted in the
pseudo first order rate constant (or force of infection, λ2) shown in Eq.
(3). No distinction was made for secondary transmission by sympto-
matic vs. asymptomatic individuals. The calibrated model parameter
proved to be relatively consistent with the NoV secondary attack rate
(14%–33%) reported in the literature (Karst et al., 2015).
Table 1
Summary of dynamic QMRA model parameters and values.
Parameter Unit Value Reference
NoV shedding parameter
Symptomatic individuals gc/g-feces Log10uniform (8.2, 12.2)a Atmar et al. (2008)
Asymptomatic individuals gc/g-feces Log10uniform (7.5, 11.7)a Atmar et al. (2008)
Feces production rate (ϕ) g-feces/person-day Uniform (200, 750)a Rao (2006), Barker et al. (2013)
Wastewater generation rate L/person-day Uniform (189, 265)a USEPA (2002)
Water ingestion rate L/person-day 2.0 USEPA (2004), WHO (2008)
Initial population persons 1,000,000 Assumed
Initial latent ratio percent 0.056% Scallan et al. (2011)
Birth rate constant day−1 3.4× 10−5 (3.4 per 100,000) NCHS (2018)
Death rate constant day−1 2.3 × 10−5 (2.3 per 100,000) NCHS (2018)
Proportion of symptomatic infections percent 69% Zhang et al. (2011), Teunis et al. (2015)
Duration of latency (1/α) hours Uniform (12, 48)a CDC (2014)
Duration of disease (1/δ) days Uniform (1, 3)a Aoki et al. (2010), CDC (2014)
Duration of shedding (1/σ) days Uniform (2, 21)a Atmar et al. (2008), Aoki et al. (2010)
Duration of immunity (1/γ) years Uniform (3.2, 5.1)a Simmons et al. (2013)
Proportion of nonsecretors (τ) percent 20% Simmons et al. (2013), Currier et al. (2015)
λ1 (waterborne transmission rate constant) day−1 Static or dynamic Determined by model
λ2 (secondary transmission rate constant) day−1 Dynamic Model calibration (see Eq. (3))
λ3 (foodborne transmission rate constant) day−1 Uniform (4.29 × 10−5, 1.10 × 10−4)a,c Scallan et al. (2011)
NoV dose response model (see Eq. (1))
Fraction of susceptible subjects (P) – 0.722 Messner et al. (2014)
Mean aggregate size (µ) – 1106 Messner et al. (2014)
NoV occurrence
WW (for static model) gc/L Lognormal (9.10, 2.56)b Eftim et al. (2017) [n = 219]
SW (prior to blending) gc/L Lognormal (6.04, 1.22)b Lodder and de Roda Husman (2005) [n=8]
Environmental buffer
SW recycled water contribution percent 20% Rice et al. (2015), Amoueyan et al. (2019)
SW storage time days 270 Wu (2015), Amoueyan et al. (2019)
SW temperature °C 20 Assumed
SW die-off rate constant d−1 0.862 Amoueyan et al. (2019)
a (minimum, maximum).
b (μ, σ) where =
+
μ ln( )m
2
s2 m2
, = +σ ln(1 )2 s2
m2
, m = mean, s = standard deviation.
c adjusted to account for both symptomatic and asymptomatic foodborne infections.
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= × + +λ 0.156 C1 D C2
N2 (3)
where, λ2 = time-variant secondary force of infection (day−1);
0.156 = calibrated model parameter (day−1); C1 + C2 + D= number
of carrier/diseased individuals in the community (persons); and
N = total population (persons).
Finally, the force of infection for primary transmission via con-
taminated food (λ3) was incorporated into the model as a uniform
distribution ranging from 4.29 × 10−5 day−1 to 1.10 × 10−4 day−1.
These values were determined from the 90% confidence interval for
symptomatic foodborne NoV reported in Scallan et al. (2011), which
ranged from 3.23 million to 8.31 million cases annually across a total
population of 299 million. The values reported in Scallan et al. (2011)
were increased to account for both symptomatic (69%) and asympto-
matic (31%) infections.
2.2. Natural and engineered treatment processes
This QMRA focused on three different treatment scenarios: (a) de
facto reuse, (b) direct potable reuse (DPR) with “full advanced treat-
ment” (CDPH, 2014), and (c) DPR with ozone-based treatment (Fig. 3).
Similar to Amoueyan et al. (2019), the current model simulated virus
LRVs for dilution and natural die-off in the environmental buffer and
inactivation and physical removal during engineered water and was-
tewater treatment. The ‘observed’ and ‘regulatory’ virus LRVs are
summarized in Table 2 and are described in greater detail later. The
current model assumed direct distribution to the consumer for the two
DPR systems rather than raw water or treated water augmentation (i.e.,
blending before/after conventional drinking water treatment). The
major distinction from Amoueyan et al. (2019) involved the dynamic
nature of the model, which directly linked the prevalence of shedding in
the community to pathogen loads in the raw sewage. For static scenario
comparisons, the raw sewage was assumed to contain a lognormally
distributed NoV concentration with μ = 9.10 and σ = 2.56
(Eftim et al., 2017; Table 1).
Each potable reuse system included a conventional wastewater
treatment plant (WWTP), which was modeled with only secondary
biological treatment and no disinfection. The ‘observed’ LRV for the
WWTP was modeled as a normal distribution with a mean of 1.20 and
standard deviation of 0.78 (distribution fit to data from Lodder and de
Roda Husman, 2005), and the ‘regulatory’ LRV was modeled as a uni-
form distribution ranging from 1.0 to 2.0 (Trussell et al., 2016;
SWRCB, 2016).
For the de facto reuse scenario, the treated wastewater was dis-
charged to an environmental buffer (i.e., a surface water reservoir) with
a baseline recycled water contribution (RWC) of 20% (Rice et al., 2015;
Amoueyan et al., 2019) and a baseline storage time of 270 days
(Wu, 2015; Amoueyan et al., 2019). Sensitivity analyses for de facto
reuse included an RWC of 1% and storage times of 0, 15, and 30 days.
Die-off of wastewater-derived NoV was calculated using a first-order,
base e rate constant of 0.862 d−1 (Amoueyan et al., 2019), which is
consistent with the rate constant reported for murine NoV in a recent
meta-analysis (Boehm et al., 2018). The corresponding LRVs as a
function of storage/travel time are summarized in Fig. S1 in the Sup-
plementary Information (SI). The model assumed the treated waste-
water was blended with an upstream surface water (not impacted by
storage/travel time) containing a lognormally distributed NoV con-
centration with μ = 6.04 and σ = 1.22 (distribution fit to data from
Lodder and de Roda Husman, 2005; Table 1).
Fig. 3. Potable reuse treatment trains included in the dynamic QMRA. The conventional wastewater treatment plant (WWTP) included only secondary wastewater
treatment. The drinking water treatment plant (DWTP) represented a conventional filtration system with chlorine (Cl2) disinfection and was assumed to be compliant
with the U.S. EPA's Surface Water Treatment Rules. The chlorination step included in the engineered storage buffer (ESB) was assumed to be compliant with
guidelines for ESBs in DPR systems. DPR = direct potable reuse, FAT = full advanced treatment, MF = microfiltration, RO = reverse osmosis, UV = ultraviolet
disinfection, UF = ultrafiltration, BAC = biological activated carbon.
Table 2
Pathogen log reduction values (LRVs) for engineered treatment processes. A
temperature of 25 °C was assumed for ozone CT calculations. Failure prob-
abilities reflected the production of a random 2-L aliquot of water each day.
N = normal distribution (mean, standard deviation) and U = uniform dis-
tribution (min, max).
Process Failure
Probability
Observed LRVs Regulatory LRVs
WWTP CAS – N (1.20, 0.78)c U (1.0, 2.0)m,n
DWTP filter 0.0a 2.0d 2.0d
DWTP Cl2 0.0a 4.0e 4.0e
MF 0.0029b U (1.50, 3.30)f 0.0m,n
UF 0.0029b N (4.00, 0.10)g,h 1.0m,n
RO 0.018a N (4.30, 0.34)g,i U (1.0, 2.0)m,n
BAC 0.0a U (0.00, 1.00)f 0.0m,n
Ozone 0.0022b Determined based on ozone CT (Eq. (4)); Baseline
CT = 5 mg-min/L j,k
UV 0.002a Determined based on UV dose (Eq. (5)); Baseline
UV dose = 80 mJ/cm2 j,k
ESB Cl2 0.0a 4.0l 4.0l
a Soller et al. (2018b).
b Forss and Ander (2011).
c Lodder and de Roda Husman (2005).
d USEPA (2006).
e Regli et al. (1991).
f Soller et al. (2017).
g Chaudhry et al. (2017).
h Matsushita et al. (2013).
i Governal and Gerba (1999) with MS2 as a surrogate.
j Amoueyan et al. (2017).
k Text S2.
l Salveson et al. (2016).
m Trussell et al. (2016).
n SWRCB (2016). WWTP = wastewater treatment plant; CAS = conven-
tional activated sludge; DWTP = drinking water treatment plant;
Cl2 = chlorine disinfection; MF = microfiltration; UF = ultrafiltration;
RO = reverse osmosis; BAC = biological activated carbon; UV = ultraviolet
disinfection; ESB = engineered storage buffer.
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For de facto reuse, the blended water was then treated at a con-
ventional drinking water treatment plant (DWTP), which was credited
with 2.0 logs for filtration [consistent with the U.S. EPA's Surface Water
Treatment Rule (SWTR)] and an additional 4.0 logs for chlorine dis-
infection. According to Regli et al. (1991), a chlorine CT achieving 0.5-
log removal/inactivation of Giardia, which would meet the require-
ments of the U.S. EPA's SWTR, would also achieve >4-log virus in-
activation, hence the 4-log credit for chlorine disinfection at the DWTP.
The DPR system with full advanced treatment (FAT) included a
conventional WWTP, microfiltration (MF), reverse osmosis (RO), ul-
traviolet (UV) disinfection, an engineered storage buffer with free
chlorine disinfection, and direct distribution to the consumer. The
combination of RO and a UV advanced oxidation process (AOP) is de-
scribed as FAT in some regulatory contexts (Gerrity et al., 2013;
CDPH, 2014). The UV process in the current study was modeled with a
more conservative disinfection-based dose of 80 mJ/cm2 instead of the
higher doses typically employed for AOPs (i.e., >100 mJ/cm2). The
ozone-based DPR system included a conventional WWTP, ultrafiltration
(UF), ozone, biological activated carbon (BAC), UV disinfection, an
engineered storage buffer with free chlorine disinfection, and direct
distribution to the consumer.
For DPR, pathogen attenuation was modeled with point estimates,
probability distributions based on observed performance or typical
regulatory credits, or a calculated value based on conditions simulated
by the model (for ozone and UV) (Table 2). The ozone LRV was cal-
culated using Eq. (4), which is a generalized ozone dose response curve
for virus inactivation (USEPA, 2010), and an assumed temperature
during treatment of 25 °C. The target ozone CT was 5 mg-min/L, but the
actual CT was calculated by the model based on ozone demand/decay
kinetics (Amoueyan et al., 2017) and simulated water quality (de-
scribed later).
⎜ ⎟− ⎛
⎝
⎞
⎠
= × ×log N
N
2.1744 (1.0726) CT
0
Temp
(4)
where, CT = product of ozone residual and contact time (mg-min/L)
and Temp = temperature (°C). The LRV for UV disinfection was cal-
culated using Eq. (5) and a base 10 rate constant of 0.150 (mJ/cm2)−1,
which is based on experiments with murine norovirus (Lee al., 2008).
⎜ ⎟− ⎛
⎝
⎞
⎠
= ×log N
N
k D
0
UV
(5)
where, kUV = base 10 UV254 inactivation rate constant = 0.150 (mJ/
cm2)−1 and D = UV254 dose (mJ/cm2).
In accordance with CDPH (2014), the model LRVs for ozone and UV
were limited to 6.0 logs for both the ‘observed’ and ‘regulatory’ sce-
narios. The ‘regulatory’ scenario was most impacted by changes in
membrane LRVs, with MF receiving 0 logs, UF limited to 1.0 log (point
estimate), and RO limited to a uniform distribution ranging from 1.0 to
2.0 logs (Trussell et al., 2016; SWRCB, 2016).
Treatment train performance considered unit process failures
(modeled with an LRV of 0) using published failure probabilities
(Forss and Ander, 2011; Soller et al., 2018b; Table 2), and the model
also considered cascading failures or ‘domino effects’. As described
previously in Amoueyan et al. (2019), both DPR systems assumed a
baseline UV dose of 80 mJ/cm2, and the ozone-based DPR system as-
sumed a baseline ozone to total organic carbon ratio (O3/TOC) of 1.1
during nominal operating conditions, which achieved an ozone CT of
5 mg-min/L. Failures of one or more upstream treatment processes
resulted in increases in TOC concentration and the UV254 absorbance of
the target water matrix (Amoueyan et al., 2017; 2019), as summarized
in Table S2. The model assumed the applied ozone dose, ozone contact
time, incident UV intensity, and UV exposure time all remained con-
stant during a cascading failure condition, thereby reducing the efficacy
of these processes due to the change in feed water quality (Text S2). The
resulting LRVs for ozone and UV are summarized in Tables S3 and S4.
Because of the assumed robustness of ozone and UV for NoV inactiva-
tion, the only cascading failures that actually impacted performance
were simultaneous failures of MF and RO (LRV = 4.1 for UV) and UF
and ozone (LRV = 4.2 for UV). All other scenarios resulted in the
maximum allowable LRV of 6.0 for ozone and/or UV, except when
those specific processes failed and were credited with 0 logs.
2.3. Model scenarios
Model simulations were performed for multiple scenarios to eluci-
date the relative significance of each exposure pathway. For scenario 1,
exposure to NoV occurred only through contaminated drinking water,
and the corresponding pathogen load to the wastewater treatment plant
was dynamic in nature due to infected individuals shedding NoV into
the raw sewage (λ1 = dynamic, λ2 = 0, λ3 = 0). For scenario 2, ex-
posure to NoV occurred through contaminated drinking water, sec-
ondary transmission, and contaminated food (λ1 = dynamic,
λ2 = dynamic, λ3 = uniform distribution); scenario 2 also included a
comparison of ‘observed’ vs. ‘regulatory’ LRVs for the DPR systems. For
scenario 3, exposure to NoV occurred through contaminated drinking
water, secondary transmission, and contaminated food, but the raw
sewage pathogen load was static in nature (λ1 = static, λ2 = dynamic,
λ3 = uniform distribution). Finally, scenarios 4 and 5 included a dy-
namic drinking water risk, but only secondary transmission (scenario 4:
λ1 = dynamic, λ2 = dynamic, λ3 = 0) or foodborne transmission
(scenario 5: λ1 = dynamic, λ2 = 0, λ3 = uniform distribution) was
included as an alternative exposure route. These scenarios are sum-
marized later in Table 3.
2.4. Modeling approach and risk calculations
The dynamic model was developed in STELLA 10.1 (ISEE Systems,
Lebanon, NH). The movement of individuals through the various epi-
demiological states was modeled using a series of ordinary differential
equations based on the model structure illustrated in Fig. 1 and the
parameters summarized in Table 1. All states except the susceptible
state (S) were modeled as distributed delays using gamma distributions
with a shape parameter of 4 (Soller and Eisenberg, 2008; Zelner et al.,
2010; Fig. 1). Because the model simulated true travel times for each
‘parcel’ of water and for movement of individuals between epidemio-
logical states, a typical 365-day simulation would not have been ade-
quate to achieve steady state conditions (Eisenberg et al., 2004). In-
stead, each model iteration included daily estimates over a 10-year
simulation (3650 data points per iteration), and overall results were
based on 1,000 model iterations (3,650,000 total data points). A ‘delta
time’ (DT) value (i.e., the time interval simulated by each model cal-
culation) was set at 1/8th of a day in the STELLA 10.1 software.
Daily cumulative incidence (CIdaily) was used as the principal
measure of overall risk and was calculated as the number of individuals
who entered either the diseased state (D) or the asymptomatic carrier
state (C1) during each simulated day divided by the total population for
that day (Eisenberg et al., 2004; Soller and Eisenberg, 2008). The CI
was then annualized for each simulation year (i.e., 10 CIannual values
per iteration) using Eq. (6). Therefore, CIannual can also be described as
the annual risk of infection per person for the dynamic QMRA.
∏= − −
=
CI 1 (1 CI )annual
i 1
365
daily i (6)
where, CIannual = cumulative incidence for a given simulation year
(infections/person-year) and CIdaily = daily cumulative incidence (in-
fections/person-day).
The model was validated as suggested by Sterman (2000). These
tests included structure assessment, dimensional consistency, behavior
reproduction, integration error, extreme conditions, and sensitivity
analysis. Moreover, results from the previous static model
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(Amoueyan et al., 2019) were compared with the current dynamic
model to evaluate consistencies/differences in model output.
3. Results and discussion
3.1. Annual cumulative incidence
Table 3 summarizes the annualized cumulative incidence for each of
the potable reuse systems and modeling scenarios. For de facto reuse, a
comparison of the static model (Amoueyan et al., 2019) and scenario 1
provides validation for the dynamic modeling framework in that the
various CIannual values were relatively consistent between each study.
As noted in Amoueyan et al. (2019) and explained later, wastewater-
derived NoV had no discernible impact on annual risk in the de facto
reuse system because of the robustness of the environmental buffer.
Therefore, the lower CIannual observed for the dynamic model resulted
from the time dependence of the epidemiological states, particularly the
duration of immunity. In both models, the mean and median CIannual
was approximately 3 × 10−4 infections/person-year, again dominated
by the upstream surface water NoV concentration, and the maximum
CIannual was approximately 4 × 10−4 infections/person-year for the
dynamic model and 5 × 10−4 infections/person-year for the static
model.
For de facto reuse, scenarios 2 (dynamic λ1+λ2+λ3) and 3 (static
λ1+λ2+λ3) resulted in identical CIannual values because the risk was
dominated by secondary and foodborne transmission. The effects of
pathogen shedding into the raw wastewater were negated by the
dominance of the alternative exposure pathways and the robustness of
the environmental buffer, which attenuated any increase in raw sewage
NoV concentrations. In scenario 4, the mean CIannual decreased by ap-
proximately 50% once foodborne transmission was eliminated, while in
scenario 5, the elimination of secondary transmission resulted in an
80% reduction in CIannual. Therefore, the model demonstrated that
secondary transmission was the most important exposure pathway,
which is consistent with NoV epidemiology.
The DPR results were generally identical to those of the de facto
reuse system for scenarios 2a and 3, which is expected considering that
secondary transmission and primary transmission via contaminated
food were the dominant exposure pathways. The robustness of the DPR
treatment trains with ‘observed’ LRVs generally masked differences in
raw sewage pathogen loading for the dynamic (scenario 2a) and static
(scenario 3) scenarios. The only exception was the maximum risk for
FAT-based DPR, which was slightly higher for the dynamic pathogen
loading in scenario 2a. In fact, it was not even possible to run scenario 1
for DPR (dynamic λ1 and λ2 = λ3 = 0) because the DPR systems
adequately attenuated the NoV shed by the initial latent population,
and there were no further inputs of NoV into the system. Scenario 2b
(‘regulatory’ LRVs) exhibited a 13% increase in the maximum CIannual
for ozone-based DPR and increases of 15–33% for all risk estimates for
FAT-based DPR. Therefore, even with ‘regulatory’ LRVs, ozone-based
DPR was sufficiently robust to attenuate all pathogen loads, except in
the case of a low-frequency compound failure (i.e., maximum risk).
FAT-based DPR was more sensitive to the lower ‘regulatory’ LRVs, and
the adverse effects were not limited to compound failure instances.
To evaluate potential links between maximum risk and time, max-
imum CIannual was plotted as a function of simulation year, with the
results for de facto reuse presented in Fig. 4 and DPR presented in Fig.
S2. Year 1 exhibited the highest CIannual for most systems and modeling
scenarios, in part due to the initial latent population. For de facto reuse
under scenario 1, the risk decreased from the year 1 max and rapidly
reached steady state at a slightly lower value than estimated by the
static model. With the effects of secondary and foodborne transmission
(scenarios 2 and 3), similar temporal trends were observed for all three
potable reuse systems, although the risks were elevated and consistent
with the aforementioned data from Table 3. The most interesting
temporal trend was observed for scenario 4, which was dominated by
secondary transmission in the absence of foodborne transmission
(λ3 = 0). This combination caused a significant oscillation in maximum
CIannual, which fluctuated by several orders of magnitude for the first
several years. The data exhibited a dampening effect toward the end of
Table 3
Annual cumulative incidence (CIannual; infections/person-year) over the 10-year simulation period as a function of potable reuse paradigm, treatment train, and
modeling scenario. For the ‘static’ conditions, the drinking water risk (λ1) was determined using statistical distributions of NoV concentration in the raw sewage and
upstream surface water (when applicable) and attenuation during engineered treatment and in the environmental buffer (EB; when applicable). For the ‘dynamic’
conditions, the NoV concentration in the raw sewage was directly linked to pathogen shedding within the community. λ2 (secondary transmission) and λ3 (foodborne
transmission) are defined in Table 1. For DPR, scenario 2 was modeled with (a) observed and (b) regulatory log removal values for each engineered treatment process
(see Table 2).
Model λ1 λ2 λ3 Mean SD 50th 95th Max
de facto: WWTP-EB-DWTP
Statica Static 0 0 3.39× 10−4 3.14× 10−5 3.36× 10−4 3.95× 10−4 4.86×10−4
Dynamic 1 Dynamic 0 0 2.81× 10−4 3.36× 10−5 2.71× 10−4 3.76× 10−4 4.12×10−4
Dynamic 2 Dynamic Dynamic Uniform 1.03× 10−1 4.98× 10−2 8.63× 10−2 2.51× 10−1 2.52×10−1
Dynamic 3 Static Dynamic Uniform 1.03× 10−1 4.98× 10−2 8.63× 10−2 2.51× 10−1 2.52×10−1
Dynamic 4 Dynamic Dynamic 0 5.18× 10−2 5.70× 10−2 3.08× 10−2 1.89× 10−1 1.89×10−1
Dynamic 5 Dynamic 0 Uniform 2.11× 10−2 4.30× 10−4 2.10× 10−2 2.21× 10−2 2.24×10−2
DPR1: WWTP-MF-RO-UV-ESB (Scenario 2a=observed LRVs and Scenario 2b= regulatory LRVs)
Statica Static 0 0 1.45× 10−8 2.19× 10−7 4.40× 10−11 5.31× 10−9 5.01×10−6
Dynamic 1 Dynamic 0 0 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Dynamic 2a Dynamic Dynamic Uniform 1.03× 10−1 5.04× 10−2 8.60× 10−2 2.51× 10−1 3.47×10−1
Dynamic 2b Dynamic Dynamic Uniform 1.28× 10−1 7.83× 10−2 9.91× 10−2 3.08× 10−1 4.62×10−1
Dynamic 3 Static Dynamic Uniform 1.02× 10−1 4.98× 10−2 8.60× 10−2 2.51× 10−1 2.51×10−1
Dynamic 4 Dynamic Dynamic 0 4.88× 10−2 5.86× 10−2 8.17× 10−3 1.87× 10−1 3.22×10−1
Dynamic 5 Dynamic 0 Uniform 2.09× 10−2 1.51× 10−3 2.08× 10−2 2.18× 10−2 8.65×10−2
DPR2: WWTP-UF-O3-BAC-UV-ESB (Scenario 2a=observed LRVs and Scenario 2b= regulatory LRVs)
Statica Static 0 0 1.68× 10−11 5.21× 10−10 0.00 5.18× 10−13 1.65×10−8
Dynamic 1 Dynamic 0 0 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Dynamic 2a Dynamic Dynamic Uniform 1.02× 10−1 4.98× 10−2 8.59× 10−2 2.51× 10−1 2.52×10−1
Dynamic 2b Dynamic Dynamic Uniform 1.03× 10−1 4.99× 10−2 8.59× 10−2 2.51× 10−1 2.88×10−1
Dynamic 3 Static Dynamic Uniform 1.02× 10−1 4.98× 10−2 8.60× 10−2 2.51× 10−1 2.51×10−1
Dynamic 4 Dynamic Dynamic 0 4.87× 10−2 5.76× 10−2 2.47× 10−2 1.87× 10−1 1.88×10−1
Dynamic 5 Dynamic 0 Uniform 2.08× 10−2 4.22× 10−4 2.08× 10−2 2.18× 10−2 2.22×10−2
a Amoueyan et al. (2019).
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the simulation, as the maximum CIannual for each potable reuse system
approached that of scenario 2(a). Scenario 5 (λ2 = 0) was dominated
by foodborne transmission, for which the corresponding rate constant
was modeled as a uniform distribution, so it exhibited little variability
in maximum CIannual across the 10-year simulation.
3.2. Isolating the effects of treatment on drinking water risk
3.2.1. Log removal value distributions
While the model and actual epidemiology of NoV agree that alter-
native exposure routes appear to dominate public health risk, it is still
important to understand how the level of treatment in a potable reuse
system specifically impacts drinking water risk. Fig. 5 illustrates the
distribution of LRVs for de facto reuse (with and without an environ-
mental buffer), FAT-based DPR, and ozone-based DPR. The corre-
sponding frequency distributions and raw data for Fig. 5 are shown in
Fig. S3. Because the baseline storage time of 270 days resulted in an
equivalent LRV of∼100, results for shorter storage times of 0, 15, and
30 days are provided in Figs. 5 and S3.
These results indicate that de facto reuse with a storage time of at
least 15 days or DPR with either ‘regulatory’ or ‘observed’ LRVs is
generally sufficient to achieve the 12-log benchmark for virus removal.
De facto reuse with 15-day storage was comparable to FAT-based DPR,
while de facto reuse with 30-day storage was comparable to ozone-
based DPR. The LRV sometimes dropped below the 12-log benchmark
during failure conditions, with absolute minimum LRVs of 5.0 for
‘regulatory’ FAT, 5.5 for ‘observed’ FAT, 6.1 for ‘regulatory’ ozone, and
6.4 for ‘observed’ ozone-based treatment (Fig. 5). These extreme con-
ditions are highly improbable (i.e., <20 instances per 3,650,000 data
points) because they require compound treatment failures (e.g., si-
multaneous failures of O3 and UV for ozone-based DPR) in addition to
low estimates for the remaining treatment processes (e.g., activated
sludge and BAC). Moreover, as noted in Amoueyan et al. (2019), the
framework in the current model may provide reasonable estimates of
failure frequency but may overestimate the severity of a failure, as
compound treatment failures resulting in actual LRV reductions may
have probabilities as low as 10−11 (Pecson et al., 2018). Therefore, all
potable reuse systems in the current study are expected to consistently
achieve the 12-log benchmark for virus removal/inactivation. The de
facto reuse system with at least 30-day storage, FAT-based DPR with
‘observed’ credits, and ozone-based DPR also achieve the 15-log target
recommended by Soller et al. (2018a).
3.2.2. de facto reuse assuming ‘pristine’ upstream surface water
To isolate the effects of wastewater-derived NoV on de facto reuse,
the NoV contribution from the upstream surface water was eliminated,
and the model was also revised to include RWCs of 1% and 20% and
storage times of 0, 15, and 30 days. The resulting daily drinking water
risks (dynamic λ1) and daily cumulative incidences (CIdaily; also in-
cludes effects of λ2 and λ3) are illustrated in Fig. 6. As expected, there
were clear increases in λ1 with shorter storage times and with the
higher RWC of 20%, but assuming at least 15 days of storage, there was
no difference in CIdaily for RWCs of 1% or 20%, thereby indicating that
the alternative exposure routes were still dominating the overall risk.
This is consistent with the high LRV achieved by de facto reuse with at
least 15 days of storage (Fig. 5).
With 0 days of storage, which effectively represented a DPR sce-
nario, there was a sufficient increase in λ1 to cause a noticeable change
in CIdaily. In fact, because λ1 was so high, it caused a sharp spike in
infections within the community early in the simulation, which was
then followed by a sharp decline in infections due to the lower popu-
lation of susceptible individuals, particularly for the RWC of 1%. This is
reflected in the wide distribution of λ1 and CIdaily values for 0-day
storage in Fig. 6. The time dependencies of λ1 and CIdaily are also il-
lustrated in Fig. 7. For 0-day storage, RWCs of 1% and 20% both re-
sulted in a similar CIdaily, but the RWC of 1% fluctuated more
throughout the simulation. With low drinking water risk (i.e., storage
time ≥15 days), there was a small spike in CIdaily early in the simula-
tion, which was actually unrelated to drinking water risk, and then
CIdaily quickly reached a steady state condition.
According to Brunkard et al. (2011), only 6.4% of all waterborne
disease cases associated with drinking water in the U.S. between 2007
and 2008 (265 out of 4,128 cases) were linked to NoV. Assuming a
symptomatic ratio of 69%, this would yield a total of 384 infections
across∼300 million people. This corresponds with an estimated annual
NoV risk from drinking water of 1.3 × 10−6, or a daily NoV risk from
drinking water of λ1 = 3.5 × 10−9. According to Fig. 7, this is con-
sistent with the estimated drinking water risk for de facto reuse with 15
days of storage and an RWC of 1%, which suggests that this combina-
tion might be broadly representative of drinking water systems in the
U.S.
3.2.3. Direct potable reuse
The distributions in daily drinking water risk (λ1) for the DPR sys-
tems are illustrated in Fig. 8. The distributions differed considerably
between the various modeling scenarios for several reasons, including
the effects of FAT vs. ozone-based treatment, ‘observed’ vs. ‘regulatory’
Fig. 4. Maximum annual cumulative incidence (infections/person-year) for the
de facto reuse system as a function of simulation year and static and dynamic
modeling scenarios. The data represent the maximum values for each simula-
tion year across 1000 model simulations, except for the static scenario. The
corresponding data for direct potable reuse are provided in Fig. S2.
Fig. 5. Model output for log removal values (LRVs), with distributions de-
monstrating the implications of treatment process variability and failure. The de
facto reuse data indicate the cumulative LRV for the engineered treatment
processes, dilution, and die-off for the indicated storage time. The baseline
condition for the environmental buffer was actually 270 days, which resulted in
an equivalent LRV of ∼100. For full advanced treatment (FAT) and ozone-
based direct potable reuse (DPR), separate data are shown for typical regulatory
LRVs and observed LRVs from the literature. Boxes represent 5th, 50th, and
95th percentiles, and whiskers indicate minimum and maximum values. The
dashed line represents the target LRV for virus inactivation and removal in
some U.S. potable reuse regulations.
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LRVs, dynamic vs. static λ1, and whether alternative exposure path-
ways (λ2 and λ3) were considered. For all scenarios except ‘regulatory’
FAT (i.e., scenario 2b), the 95th percentile risk was lower than the 10−4
annual risk equivalent, but the maximum risks exceeded that bench-
mark. As explained earlier, this was due to infrequent compound fail-
ures causing significant reductions in the overall LRV for each DPR
treatment train. In some cases, particularly for ozone-based DPR, the
maximum risk was the only value that could be calculated by the model
because all other risk estimates were ∼0.
For scenario 3 (static λ1), only the 95th percentile and/or maximum
risk could be calculated by the model for both DPR treatment trains.
This indicated that the pathogen load to the wastewater treatment plant
under static conditions was more easily attenuated during treatment. As
shown in Fig. 9, the lognormally distributed NoV concentrations in the
static model (centered around 104 gc/L) were significantly lower than
the concentrations estimated by the dynamic model—a difference of
∼2 orders of magnitude when excluding secondary and foodborne
transmission but up to ∼4 orders of magnitude when all exposure
routes were considered. When considering λ1, λ2, and λ3, the NoV
concentration in the raw wastewater was similar across all three po-
table reuse systems (median of ∼108 gc/L), consistent with their si-
milar CI values. When excluding secondary transmission (λ2 = 0), the
median pathogen load decreased to∼107 gc/L for all three systems, but
when excluding foodborne transmission (λ3 = 0), the effects were
highly variable, which is consistent with the aforementioned oscilla-
tions in risk for scenario 4 (shown previously in Figs. 4 and S2). For de
facto reuse, the median raw wastewater concentration in scenario 4 was
∼107 gc/L, but for DPR, the model predicted concentrations as low as
0 gc/L and as high as ∼1011 gc/L on a given day for FAT. The range
was tighter for ozone-based treatment, and both systems exhibited a
Fig. 6. (top) Daily risk from drinking water (λ1, d−1) and (bottom) daily cu-
mulative incidence (CIdaily, infections/person-day) as a function of environ-
mental buffer storage time in de facto reuse systems. These model output as-
sumed no NoV were present in the upstream surface water to isolate the effects
of wastewater-derived NoV. Daily cumulative incidence included contributions
from secondary and foodborne transmission. For each graph, separate plots are
shown for recycled water contributions (RWCs) of (left) 0.01 and (right) 0.20.
Boxes represent 5th, 50th, and 95th percentiles, and whiskers indicate
minimum and maximum values. The dashed line in the top figure corresponds
to an annualized risk of 10−4.
Fig. 7. Temporal variability in (top) daily drinking water risk (λ1, d−1) and
(bottom) daily cumulative incidence (CIdaily, infections/person-day) for the de
facto reuse system as a function of environmental buffer storage time and re-
cycled water contribution (RWC). For CIdaily, all 15-day and 30-day data
overlap. The model output assumed no NoV were present in the upstream
surface water to isolate the effects of wastewater-derived NoV. Daily cumula-
tive incidence included contributions from secondary and foodborne trans-
mission.
Fig. 8. Daily risk from drinking water (λ1, d−1) as a function of modeling
scenario. Boxes represent 5th, 50th, and 95th percentiles, and whiskers indicate
minimum and maximum values. For some scenarios, only the maximum risk
was quantifiable by the model (i.e., >0). The dashed line corresponds with an
annualized risk of 10−4.
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median concentration of ∼107 gc/L.
Raw wastewater NoV concentrations have been a point of un-
certainty in other QMRAs. For example, Amoueyan et al. (2019) as-
sumed a mean of ∼103.95 gc/L and Soller et al. (2018a) assumed a
mean of 104.70 gc/L. Both assumptions were based on the NoV review of
Eftim et al. (2017), although Amoueyan et al. (2019) excluded seasonal
effects and included data only from North America. Other occurrence
studies reported raw wastewater NoV concentrations as high as
107.5 gc/L for a single office building (Jahne, 2017) and 107.7 gc/L for a
single wastewater treatment plant affected by a seasonal spike in pa-
thogen load (Simmons et al., 2011). It may be justifiable to use these
high-end estimates of raw wastewater NoV concentrations for QMRAs
considering that the model generated median concentrations ranging
from 107–108 gc/L and maximum concentrations as high as 1011 gc/L
in the community's raw sewage. However, the model did not account
for any inactivation or physical removal that might occur in the sewer
system. That could potentially reduce the peak concentrations pre-
dicted by the model, which would then cause them to align more clo-
sely with the estimates of Jahne (2017) and Simmons et al. (2011).
Further study is needed to clarify the most appropriate concentrations
to use for raw sewage and to quantify the expected level of inactivation
in sewer systems.
4. Conclusion
The main goals of this study were to evaluate the performance of
different potable reuse systems in the context of NoV risk and to com-
pare the relative significance of primary (contaminated water and food)
vs. secondary exposure, as this is rarely addressed in the QMRA lit-
erature. Consistent with real-world epidemiology, the results suggested
that NoV infections were mainly attributable to secondary transmission
and/or primary transmission via contaminated food. As long as the
potable reuse system achieved the 10−4 annual risk benchmark, the
drinking water had no discernible impact on overall risk. For de facto
reuse, this was highly dependent on storage time in the environmental
buffer. With a storage time of at least 15 days, the environmental buffer
adequately attenuated the pathogen load to the system because of NoV's
assumed rapid die-off kinetics. With a storage time of at least 30 days,
the de facto reuse system was comparable or even superior to advanced
treatment for DPR. Under normal operational conditions, both DPR
treatment trains achieved the 10−4 annual risk benchmark, but com-
pound failures combined with elevated NoV loads to the raw sewage
resulted in short-term spikes in public health risk. It is important to note
that such conditions are unlikely to occur because of the low probability
of a catastrophic failure and the fact that DPR systems would likely
require fail-safe protocols to mitigate or eliminate the impacts of a
catastrophic failure. This highlights the robustness of advanced treat-
ment trains typically employed for potable reuse but also underscores
the importance of treatment process verification (e.g., by monitoring
surrogate parameters at critical control points) to rapidly identify off-
specification or failure conditions. Lastly, the elevated pathogen loads
predicted by the dynamic model warrant further study to clarify whe-
ther elevated NoV concentrations should be assumed for QMRAs.
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